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Abstract
This paper studies the international macroeconomic e®ects of mi-
croeconomic measures, aimed at improving the e±ciency of public
spending management by increasing the price-elasticity of public con-
sumption. In order to do this, we develop a New Open Economy
Macroeconomics (NOEM) model in which the elasticity of substitu-
tion between di®erentiated goods in public consumption is di®erent
from the one in private consumption and the optimal mark-up is en-
dogenous. This allows us to disentangle the international e®ects of
structural reforms that improvethee±ciency of spendingin thepublic
sector. We¯nd that such policies can signi¯cantly a®ect themacroeco-
nomic interdependence pattern that follows asymmetric ¯scal shocks.
In welfare terms, we ¯nd that the countries with a larger government
sector have an incentive to promote global \public competition poli-
cies".
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The usual disclaimer applies.1 Introduction
The way in which governments manage public spending at a microeconomic
level canhave macroeconomic implications. The goal ofthis paper is to study
how structural policies, aimed at improving the e±ciency of public spending,
can change the positive and normative interdependence pattern that follows
an asymmetric ¯scal shock. In our analysis, by \improving e±ciency" we
mean the process of reducing the degree of monopoly enjoyed by ¯rms selling
goods and services to the government, and therefore of bringing their prices
closer to marginal costs.
Many of the structural measures that governments introduce in order
to achieve this goal can be captured, in a stylized model, by an increase
in the price elasticity of demand of government expenditure. For example,
after public spending went out of control in the UK in the late 1970s, the
government switched from planning its spending in real terms (or \volume"
planning) to planning it in value terms (or \nominal" planning). Such a shift
can be modeled as a change in the price elasticity of government spending
from zero to one.1
More generally, an increase in the price-elasticity of public demand can
capture the e®ects of the implementation of other measures aimed at im-
proving the e±ciency of public spending. Examples of those measures are
policies that oblige government departments to put the provision of certain
goods and services out to tender, making private ¯rms bid competitively
to provide them. In the UK, the Thatcher government introduced numerous
measures of this sort in the 1980s. A more recent example can be foundinthe
US, where the role of private managed care organizations in the government
Medicare and Medicaid programs is increasing dramatically.2
However, most existing macroeconomic models are, for the reasons that
we will explain below, not well equipped to capture the e®ects of the policies
that we want to study. The standard way in which most macroeconomic
1See Dixon and Rankin (1995), pp. 52-53, for a discussion.
2It is now estimated that such organizations provide medical services for more that one
third of the 75 millions of bene¯ciaries of the two programs (Duggan 2002).
3models deal with government spending is to treat it as exogenous in real
terms. This is true, for example, both in Keynesian ad hoc models and in
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) tradition. Those kinds of models usually
do not di®erentiate between the various goods that enter public consump-
tion, therefore implicitly assuming that government demand for an individual
good type is also exogenous in real terms.3 In microeconomic terms, these
assumptions imply a zero price-elasticity of government demand.
The New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature, by explic-
itly modelling imperfect competition, allows a di®erentiation between the
individual goods that enter public consumption.4 A limitation of the analy-
sis carriedout so far using NOEM models is, however, the fact that aggregate
public consumption is built inthe same way as privateconsumption, with the
same elasticity of substitution between the di®erentiated goods produced in
the economy.5 This rules out the possibility of analysing the e®ects of struc-
tural government policies that canalterthe elasticity of substitutioninpublic
consumption without a®ecting the private elasticity.
In this paper we ¯ll in this gap in the literature, developing a NOEM
model in which the private and public elasticities can be disentangled. This
allows us to analyse the positive and normative implications for asymmetric
¯scal shocks of policies that increase the public elasticity of substitution.
Throughout the paper we will refer to policies that imply an increase in
the elasticity of substitution of government demand as \public competition
policies". This semantic convention rests onthe fact that, as we have stressed
above, such policies reduce the degree of monopoly enjoyed by private pro-
ducers when dealing with the government. It is important to stress again
that it would not be possible to capture the e®ects of such policies in a stan-
dard NOEM model that does not di®erentiate between the private and the
public elasticities. Obviously, in that case, a change in the public elasticity
3A noteworthy exception is Finn (1998), who di®erentiates between government's em-
ployment and goods purchases.
4The supply side of the NOEM framework can be regarded as an extension of the
closed-economy, static model presented by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
5For a survey of how ¯scal policy has been introduced in the NOEM literature, see
Ganelli and Lane (2002), section 4.
4would mean that the private elasticity is changing as well, and it would not
be possible to interpret the exercises on which we focus as consequences of
structural reforms in the government sector.
Our model shows that such policies imply, on the positive side, a reduc-
tion of the negative e®ect on relative consumption that usually follows a
balanced-budget asymmetric ¯scal shock. As standard in the NOEM frame-
work, the country that implements a balanced-budget ¯scal shock still loses,
in terms ofconsumption, relative to the foreigncountry, but the international
consumption gap can be reduced by the implementation of public competi-
tion policies. An increase in the elasticity of substitution also implies a larger
expenditure switching e®ect. The short-run increase in relative output that
follows a ¯scal shock can therefore be quantitatively bigger, when public
competition policies are implemented, even with a less depreciated exchange
rate.
On the normative side, our analysis shows that the implementation of
public competition policies raises the level of welfare of the country with a
larger public sector at foreign expenses.
The structure ofthe paper is as follows: nextsectionintroduces themodel,
section 3 investigates the positive e®ects of public competition policies, us-
ing numerical solutions based on the reduced forms derived from a linearized
version of the model, section 4 discusses some welfare results; section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The Model
We use a standard NOEM model (similar to the one developed by Obstfeld
and Rogo® 1995, 1996), modi¯ed to allow for an elasticity of substitution
in public consumption di®erent from the one in private consumption. There
are two countries in the world that we label Home and Foreign. The world
population is normalized to one. Home agents are on the interval [0;n],
foreign agents on the interval (n;1]. Since we assume perfect symmetry
in preferences and parameters, we will only present the equations for the
domestic economy.
52.1 Private Agents
The domestic representative agent gains utility from domestic private con-
sumption, real balances and leisure. The agents' optimization problem is



























¡ Ct ¡ ¿t (2)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, all the parameters are positive and
the last term in the utility function captures thedisutility, in terms of reduced
leisure, of supplying anamountof labour equal toL. Theonly internationally
traded bond is a riskless real bond denominated in terms of the composite
consumption good, that we denote with B, rt is the real interest rate on this
bond between t¡1 and t: Mt¡1 denotes nominal money balances held at the
beginning of period t:6 Agents also supply labour in a perfectly competitive
labour market, receive pro¯ts shares from domestic ¯rms ¦t
Pt, that we assume
to be uniformly distributed, and pay lump-sum taxes ¿t:
The private consumption index aggregates across the di®erentiated goods
produced by all ¯rms in the economy, both at home and abroad. Firms enjoy
a certain degree of monopolistic competition when dealing with private con-
sumers, speci¯ed by the magnitude of the parameter µ > 1: Denoting with z
a generic representative ¯rm, with c(z) the consumption of the di®erentiated
output of this ¯rm by the representative agent and with p(z) the domestic
currency price of this output, the aggregate private consumption index and









6Note that we adopt Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996) timing convention, Mt therefore de-
notes money between period t and period t + 1, while Bt denotes bonds between period










As already stressed above, the main innovation of our model is that of al-
lowing the elasticity of public spending to be di®erent from the elasticity
of private spending. In order to do this, we introduce a government whose
consumption in real terms is an aggregate of all the di®erentiated goods pro-
duced in the economy, with a certain elasticity of substitution ´ that, unlike
in previous NOEM models, is not restricted to be equal to µ: The Home gov-
ernment aggregate consumption and the corresponding government spending

















The government follows a balanced-budget rule all the time.7 We also rule
out the possibility of seigniorage, implying that in every period Gt = ¿t. The
preferences and behavior of the foreign government are perfectly symmetric.
It is worth noticing two implications of our assumption of perfect sym-
metry. The ¯rst is that both governments consume all di®erentiated goods,
regardless of their place of production, therefore eliminating the possibility
of home bias in public spending. The second is that the parameter ´ is the
same for both countries. This means that the public competition policies
(i.e. the policies of increasing ´) that we will consider should be thought of
as global policies coordinatedinternationally, rather thanimplementedasym-
metrically by one country. Introducing home bias in government spending
and considering country-speci¯c public competition policies would undoubt-
edly be of interest for future research, but we abstract from this possibilities
in this paper.
7Because Ricardian Equivalence holds in the model, government debt would be redun-
dant.
72.3 Firms
We assume the existence of a continuous of measure one of ¯rms in the world,
n of which located in the Home country and 1 ¡ n in the Foreign country.




where E is the nominal exchange rate, de¯ned as the price of the foreign
currency in terms of the domestic currency and p¤
t(z) is the foreign currency
priceof goodz. TheLOOP assumption andthe de¯nition of theprice indexes
imply that also the purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, both for private







The fact that the LOOP and the PPP hold, together with the speci¯cation
of the private and public consumption indexes (equations 3 and 5), imply














where the superscript W denotes world aggregates.8
Finally, we assume that for each ¯rm output is simply equal to labour
input according to the production function
Yt(z) = Lt(z) (8)
2.4 Current Account Equations
The model is completed by a short-run and a long-run version of the cur-
rent account equations, where all the variables are expressed in terms of the
composite consumption good
8Since the n domestic ¯rms behave symmetrically, equation (7) also gives per-capita
output in the domestic country.
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Equation(9)isvalidinthe shortrun(whentheshock hits), whileequation
(10) is only valid across steady states.
2.5 Optimality Conditions
Using standard techniques, it is possible to show that the ¯rst order condi-
tions for the private agent's maximization problem are given by













where it+1 is the nominal interest rate between t and t +1:
Equations (11) to (13) are respectively a consumption Euler equation, a
money demandequation and a labour-leisure trade o® equation, that equates
the marginal utility of the real wage to the marginal disutility of supplying
an additional unit of labour.
While the above equations are standard in microfounded models, the
















t (z) and Y
d;g
t (z) are respectively the total private and public de-
mands for the representative good z, de¯ned as
Y
d;p














9It shouldbenoticedthatequation(14)reproducestheusualmark-up of prices
on wages, equal to µ
(µ¡1); in the special cases in which the public elasticity
is equal to the private elasticity (´ = µ) or world government spending is
zero. In the more general case, the mark-up is endogenous and, in absence
of price rigidities, private ¯rms will set prices above marginal costs taking in
to account both the private and the public elasticities, as well as the ratio of
public to private demand for their products.9 An increase in ´; by reducing
the monopoly power of ¯rms, reduce the wedge between prices and wages,
therefore generating lower pro¯ts.
However, since, following ObstfeldandRogo® (1995, 1996) we will assume
one-period price rigidity in the producers' currency, p(z) will be pre-set in the
period in which a ¯scal shock hits. Prices will be set according to equation
(14) only in the period after the shock (that we de¯ne as the long-run),
when they are free to adjust to their °exible-price values. The e®ects of the
endogenous mark up, nonetheless, will be re°ected in short-run variables due
to the presence of rational expectations.
2.6 The Initial Steady-State
The numerical solutions that we will present in section 3 are based on re-
duced forms derived from a log-linear approximation of the model around
a symmetric steady-state. To be able to capture the e®ects of a di®erent
public-spending elasticity of substitution in the linearized equations, it is
necessary to log-linearize the model starting from a non-zero government
spending position.10 In order to preserve symmetry, we consider an initial
steady state in which the positive level of public spending is the same in both
9Previous research has shown that an endogenous mark-up can also be derived either
by explicitly modeling intra-industry collusion (Rotemberg and Woodford 1992) or by
assuming that the elasticity of substitution across goods in consumption di®ers from that
in production (Gali 1994).
10Starting from a non-zero government spending steady-state value is also a desirable
feature of the analysis in itself, not present in previous NOEM contributions, such as
Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) and Ganelli (2003). The fact that we start from a non-
zero public spending steady state implies that the ratio of public to private spending in
the initial steady state enters the log-linearized equations.
10countries and initial net foreign assets are zero in both countries. Denoting
the initial pre-shock values with the subscript SS, in such a steady state the
following relationships hold: GSS = G¤
SS = GW
SS > 0; BSS = B¤
SS = 0;
pSS(z) = PSS = PGSS; p¤
SS(z) = P¤
SS = P¤
GSS; CSS = C¤
SS = CW
SS and
YSS = Y ¤
SS = Y W
SS:11 Steady-state levels of the main variables are given by
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CSS is the ratio of public to private spending in the initial steady
state. The steady-state valuesof r;C;Y andM=P coincidewiththeonesused
by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) when µ = ´ and GSS = 0: Increases in
µ and ´; by reducing the degree of monopolistic distortion in the economy,
raise the steady-state levels of output and consumption.
2.7 Log-linearization
The log-linearized version of the domestic economy is presented in Table 1.
Log-deviations in the period in which the shock hits (the short run), are




cases with a hat denote long-run variables, i.e. log deviations in the period
11G;C; and Y are expressed in per-capita terms. Given our assumption of symmetry,
world variables can be derived by multiplying the home variable by n, the foreign by 1¡n
and adding the results. For example Y W = nY + (1 ¡ n)Y ¤. Since world population is
one, aggregate and per-capita world variables coincide.
11after the one in which the shock hits, in which the economy is free to adjust
to its new, °exible-price steady state. The variables e p(h) and e p¤(f) denote,
respectively, the short-run log-deviations of the prices set by a representative
domestic and foreign ¯rm. The hypothesis of one period pre-set prices in
the producers' currency means that we can set e p(h) = e p¤(f) = 0 in all the
equations listed in Table 1 and in their analogous for the foreign economy.
Since the initial steady-state of net foreign assets is zero, b b is de¯ned as b b =
dB
CSS:12
In Table 1 Ã1;Ã2 and Ã3 are composite parameters, that are functions
of µ;´ and ¸ as de¯ned in the appendix. Log-linearization around a sym-
metric initial steady-state in which the law of one price holds implies that
the log-linearized versions of the private and of the public price indexes are
equivalent, as showninequation (15). Equations (16) to(24) are respectively
(log-linearized versions of) the world demand function for the representative
di®erentiated good, the Euler equation, short-run and long-run money de-
mand equations, the labor-leisure trade o® equation, short-run and long-run
current account equations, the optimal pricing rule (equation 14) and the
PPP equation. Because of the short-run price rigidity, equation (20) and
(23) are only valid in the long run.
12Notice that, as in Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996), the price adjustment that we are
assuming implies that whatever value of net foreign assets arises at the end of the ¯rst
period becomes the new steady-state level from the period after the shock onwards.Table 1. The log linearized domestic economy
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±
(18)
c m¡ b p = b c (19)
b l = b y = b w ¡ b c¡ b p (20)
b b = (1+ ¸)e y ¡ (1+ ¸)e p ¡ e c ¡ ¸e g (21)
b c = ±b b +(1 +¸)b y+ (1+ ¸)b p(h) ¡ (1+ ¸)b p¡ ¸b g (22)
b w ¡ b p(z) = Ã1(µ;´;¸)b c
W + Ã2(µ;´;¸)b g
W +Ã3(µ;´;¸)[b p¡ b p(h)] (23)
e e = e p¡ e p
¤ (24)
Using the equations contained in Table 1 and the analogous expressions
for theforeign economy, we derivedreduced forms for endogenous variables as
functions of ¯scal shocks and of the parameters of the model. The reduced
forms have then been used to provide the numerical solutions reported in
section 3. Given our focus on the e®ects of public competition policies in
presence ofasymmetric ¯scal shocks, inour experiments we always set money
shocks to zero.
3 The E®ects of Public Competition Policies
In this section we study how public competition policies a®ect the positive
and normative results of the model in presence of asymmetric ¯scal shocks.
In order to do so, we provide some numerical results based on the reduced
forms of the log-linearized model. Given the simple dynamics of the model,
the economy reaches the new steady state in the period after the shock. In
3.2 we show the response of domestic and foreign macroeconomic variables
13to an asymmetric ¯scal shock, in which the log-deviation of domestic gov-
ernment spending is set to 1, and the one of foreign spending is set to 0.
All shocks considered are permanent balanced-budget expansions. We com-
pare the responses of the economy for di®erent values of ´: We interpret an
increase in ´ as the implementation of global public competition policies.
Since our model is a very stylized ones, our numerical solutions should
not be read as attempts to reproduce realistic quantitative dynamics that
can be observed in real data. The parametrization of the reduced forms
that we provide is, nonetheless, useful in order to illustrate the qualitative
mechanisms at work in the model.
3.1 Calibration of the Parameters
In the benchmark calibration, we follow Sutherland (1996) in setting ¯ =
1=1:05 and µ = 6: The chosen value of ¯ is consistent with a long-run real
interest rate of about 5 percent. We consider the case ofsymmetric countries,
therefore setting n = :5. The ratio of public to private consumption in the
initial steady state is set at ¸ = :23: This value is equal to the ratioof average
government consumption expenditure to personal consumption expenditure
in the US, calculated using quarterly data for the period 1987:1 to 2003:1.13
In 3.2 we report the responses of the main macroeconomic variables to
an asymmetric ¯scal shock for the above parametrization, for di®erent values
of ´ ranging from 1.1 to 100.14 Since the long-run is reached in the period
after the shock, the graphs report the deviation from the initial steady state
in the short run (when the shock hits) and in the following period, in which
the economy reaches the new steady state.
In 3.4 we discuss some sensitivity experiments, that we carried out in or-
der tocheck the robustnessof our resultsto changes inthechosen parametriza-
tion.
13The source is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Accounts Data (available
online at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn1.html).
14A necessary condition for the government consumption index to be well de¯ned is
´ > 1 (see equation 5).
143.2 Numerical Solutions
3.3 Positive E®ects
Figures 1 to 6 present the responses of domestic and foreign consumption,
domestic and foreign output, the exchange rate and net foreign assets held
by domestic residents to an asymmetric domestic ¯scal shock, for di®erent
values of ´:
ComparingFigures 1 and 2, it is clear that our model preserves a standard
NOEM result, even when the public and the private elasticities are allowed
to di®er: in the short-run, the country that implements a balanced-budget
¯scal expansion loses, in terms of relative private consumption, compared
to the other country.15 In the case of a domestic expansion, this happens
through a fall in domestic consumption and an increase in foreign.
A novel result of our model is that an increase in the elasticity of substitu-
tion of government demand reduces the fall in relative private consumption.
In the short run this happens through both a smaller fall of domestic con-
sumption and a smaller increase in foreign. Foreign consumption is reduced
by an increase in ´ both in the short and in the long run, with a more pro-
nounced reduction in the °exible price periods. The response of domestic
consumption is reduced in the long run, but becomes less negative in the
short run, as a consequence of an increase in ´: Although individual coun-
tries consumption pro¯les are tilted both by the ¯scal shock and by changes
in the government spending elasticity, these changes are consistent with the
result ofpermanent e®ects on relative consumption, typical of NOEM models
like the one we are using.16
The main mechanism at work behind the result that an increase in the
elasticity of public demand reduces the fall in relative consumption is related
to the increase in the degree of competition in the world economy brought
about by such a policy, as we explain in what follows.
Thestandardreasonfor thefall inrelativeconsumptioninaNOEM model
15See Ganelli and Lane (2002), p.16.
16Formally, we have e c¡ e c¤ = b c¡ b c¤; this can be proved using the domestic and foreign
log-linearized Euler equations, that are not a®ected by changes in ´:
15is that domestic residents are made poorer by the higher lump-sum taxes
necessary to ¯nance the increase in spending, while foreigners are better o®
because they get all the bene¯ts of the policy, i.e. the positive stimulation of
demand, without having to bear extratax costs. An increase in ´ reduces the
degree of mark-upatall horizons, lowering¯rms' pro¯t, that areredistributed
to consumers as shares. This policy, therefore, also diminishes the bene¯ts
deriving from a ¯scal expansion in terms of increased lifetime wealth deriving
form higher redistributed pro¯t shares. This e®ect contributes to reducing
the asymmetry in bene¯ts between domestic and foreign residents, generated
by a domestic expansion. The reduction in this asymmetry explains why
domestic relative consumption falls less as ´ increases.
Although, as already stressed in section 2, prices are not set according
to formula (14) in the short-run due to nominal stickiness, the reduction in
pro¯ts associated with a higher ´ in the °exible-price periods is also re°ected
in short-run decisions through the rational expectations mechanism.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the response of domestic and foreign output.
In the case of output, unlike for consumption, short-run deviations from the
initial steady state cannot be explained as consequences of wealth changes.
This is due to the fact that, whenprices are sticky, supply-side e®ects become
irrelevant in the short-run. The short-run changes in output are therefore
mainly due to the expenditure switching e®ect that follows the exchange rate
adjustment, that we now discuss in order to shed some light on the output
e®ects.
Using the Euler equations, the money demand equations and the pur-
chasing power parity it is possible to show that the following relationship
holds between short-run relative consumption and the exchange rate
e e = ¡(e c ¡ e c
¤) (25)
Equation (25) illustrates the following mechanism (already pointed out by
Obstfeld and Rogo® 1995, 1996): when relative consumption decreases, so
does the domestic money demand compared to the foreign and, in order to
restore the equilibrium in the money market, the exchange rate has to de-
preciate (e e has to go up). Figure 5 shows this exchange rate response for our
16benchmark parametrization. By subtracting the long-run foreign demand
equation form its domestic counterpart (equation 19) and using the PPP,
with zero money shocks, we derive (b c¡ b c¤) = ¡b e: Combining the latter with
equation (25) and with the result of permanent e®ects on relative consump-
tion (see note 15), we can derive a no-overshooting result: the exchange rate
jumps immediately to its more depreciated long-run value. While the latter
result is standardinthe NOEM framework, what matters most for our analy-
sis are the e®ects of changes in ´: Figure 5 illustrates how an increase in´; by
reducing the fall in relative consumption, mitigates the nominal depreciation
that follows a domestic ¯scal shock.
The depreciation of the domestic currency and the subsequent expendi-
ture switching e®ect can easily explain the results, shown in ¯gures 3 and 4,
that the response of Home output is positive and the one of foreign output
is negative in the short-run. The result that an increase in ´ magni¯es these
e®ects (see¯gures 3 and 4), however, seems at odds with the factthat increas-
ing ´ also reduces the depreciation of the exchange rate. The contradiction
between these two outcomes is, nonetheless, only apparent.
The key to understanding how an increase in ´ can generate both a less
depreciated exchange rate and a larger gap between domestic and foreign
output is in noticing how the private and public elasticities (µ and ´); enter
as di®erentiated parameters in the demand equation (16) and in its analo-
gous expression for the foreign country. This implies that, subtracting the
foreign analogous from equation (16), and making use of the PPP and of the
one period price-rigidity assumption, we can derive the following short-run
relationship between relative output and the exchange rate




(µ + ¸´)e e (26)
As ´ increases worldwide, due to the higher competitive pressure imposed on
¯rms by the domestic and foreign governments, the degree of substitutability
between goods purchased by the governments also increases. In absence of
home bias in government expenditure, this means that, with a higher ´, the
same exchange rate variation can sustain larger shifts in relative demand for
goods, and therefore in output. The latter e®ect is formally expressed by the
17fact that an increase in ´ increases the response of e y ¡ e y¤ to e e in equation
(26). Intuitively, this mechanism reconciles the e®ects of an increase in ´ on
the exchange rate (a reduced depreciation, i.e. a less pronounced increase
in e e) and on short-run domestic and foreign output (a bigger expenditure
switching e®ect), highlighted in Figures 3, 4 and 5.
Since prices are °exible in the long-run, long-run responses of output,
unlike short-run ones, can be explained by supply-side factors. This means
that the fall in domestic output and the increase in foreign output in the
long-run, showed in Figures 3 and 4, can be interpreted as deriving respec-
tively from an increase and a fall in the demand for leisure by domestic and
foreign residents. An increase in ´ magni¯es those responses, pushing do-
mestic agents to consume more leisure and foreigners to consume less. The
decision to work less and enjoy more leisure is a®ected by the lifetime wealth
of the individuals. It is therefore useful, in order to understand the above
e®ects, to look at the response of net foreign assets, that links the short-run
and long-run dynamics of the model.
Figure 6 reports the response of net foreign assets held by domestic resi-
dents to an asymmetric ¯scal shock. As already mentioned above (see note
11), the one-period price stickiness implies that the value of net foreign as-
sets that arises at the end of the ¯rst period becomes the new steady-state
level from the period after the shock onwards. The increase in net foreign
assets is a consequence of the fact that relative consumption falls andrelative
output increases in the short run. The e®ect of a higher ´ in Figure 6 is to
increase the amount of net foreign assets held by domestic residents. This
is consistent with the short-run impact on relative output and consumption
of a higher ´; already stressed above. The Home country accumulates more
assets and the Foreign country accumulates more liability as a consequence
of the introduction of public competition policies, because domestic ¯rms
tend to increase their short-run output, in response to higher demand, as ´
increases.17
The asymmetric wealth accumulation that follows domestic ¯scal shocks
explains why domestic output falls and foreign output increases in the long
17This result is also reinforced, of course, by the opposite behavior of foreign ¯rms.
18run. The latter results should be interpreted as increased consumption of
leisure by domestic residents and reduced consumption of leisure by foreign-
ers, stemming from changes in lifetime wealth. The e®ect of the increase in
net foreign assets showed in Figure 6 is strong enough to counterbalance the
negative wealth e®ects for domestic agents, deriving form the fact that, in
the long run as well as in the short-run, they will have to pay taxes to ¯nance
the ¯scal expansion. The e®ects of changes in ´ on long-run output showed
in Figures 3 and 4 are consistent with the intuition that output moves mainly
in response to the accumulation of net foreign assets in the periods in which
prices are °exible: for domestic residents a higher ´ implies higher net foreign










































































































Figure 6: E®ects of a Domestic Fiscal Shock on Net Foreign Assets Held by
Domestic Residents: Benchmark Case
223.4 Sensitivity Experiments
In our sensitivity experiments (not reported here for reason ofspace) we have
considered the cases of a low discount factor (¯ = :9); of a high initial public
to private spending ratio (¸ = :46) and of a smaller and larger dimension
of the domestic country relative to the foreign (n = :1 and n = :9 respec-
tively). The macroeconomic interdependence pattern following a domestic
¯scal shock is, in any of the above case, qualitatively similar to the one that
the model displays in the benchmark case, even though there are obviously
di®erences in the magnitudes of some e®ects. Similarly, the e®ects of public
competition policies (increases in ´) always work in the some direction as in
the benchmark case, giving some reassurance that the results presented in
3.3 do not depend on the particular parametrization chosen.
4 Welfare E®ects
Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) have emphasized how taking output as an in-
dicator of welfare can be misleading in an open economy, in which output
and consumption movements are not necessarily correlated. Furthermore,
with an endogenous labour supply the welfare enhancing role of leisure time
also needs to be taken in to account. One of the main advantages of using
a microfounded framework is the possibility to carry out normative analysis
based on a rigorous welfare metric.
This is particularly useful for our analysis, since the positive e®ects of ¯s-
cal policy shocks and of public competition policies (increases in ´) discussed
in the previous section have divergent welfare implications. The reduction in
domestic private consumption relative to foreign and the increase in short-
run relative output (i.e. reduction in relative leisure), for example, imply
a reduction in domestic welfare compared to foreign welfare. In the long
run, on the other hand, domestic output falls and foreign output increases
following a domestic ¯scal shock. The increase in leisure associate with these
long-run output movements could counterbalance the negative e®ect deriving
from the reduction in relative consumption. The implication of increasing
23´ are also not clear if they are not added up together in a welfare metric.
A higher ´; for example, makes the response of domestic consumption less
negative in the short-run but reduces the positive consumption response in
the long run (see Figure 1), with contrasting e®ects on welfare.
In Table 2 we report the overall welfare changes both in the domestic and
in the foreign countries following a domestic ¯scal shock, for the di®erent
values of ´ considered in our experiments in section 3. As customary in
this literature, we assume that the welfare e®ects of changes in real balances
are negligible and we focus on changes in the real components of the utility







SS is lifetime real utility calculated at the initial pre-shock steady
state and dUR is obtained by totally di®erentiating (1). Taking in to account
that the new steady is reached in the period after the shock, we have
dU








The welfare e®ects reported in Table 2 correspond to a parametrization
equal to the one used for the benchmark case simulations, and a value of
k = :1:
Table 2: Welfare E®ects of a Domestic Fiscal Shock
Home Foreign
´ = 1:1 0.25 -0.59
´ = 4 0.29 -0.65
´ = µ = 6 0.32 -0.70
´ = 10 0.37 -0.77
´ = 20 0.50 -0.93
´ = 100 1.35 -1.84
Table 2 shows that the overall welfare e®ect of a domestic ¯scal shock is
positive for the domestic country and negative for the foreign country. This
numerical example suggests that the long run-gains in leisure enjoyed by the
domestic country relative to the foreign can more than o®set the decrease in
relative consumption. Table 2 also shows that increasing ´ unambiguously
magni¯es the results, increasing the positive response of domestic welfare
and the negative response of foreign welfare. The implementation of public
competition policies has an overall positive e®ect on domestic utility because
24the reduced fall in short-run consumption and the increased leisure in the
long run more than o®set the negative utility deriving from such policies, like
the fall in long-run consumption and the increase in short run output. For
the foreign country, the opposite is true.18
The ¯ndings that overall home agents gain and foreigners lose when the
domestic country expands contrasts with Obstfeld and Rogo® claim that
\overall Foreign bene¯ts and Home loses when Home's government spends
more." (ObstfeldandRogo®, 1996 pag. 706). Whilethis is undoubtedly true
if we only take in to account relative consumption movements, our analysis
shows that Obstfeld and Rogo®'s (1996) conclusion does not necessarily car-
ries on to our model for realistic parameters values. Furthermore, increases
in ´ are likely to widen the welfare di®erential between the two countries.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have focused on the positive and normative implications of
public competition policies in presence of asymmetric ¯scal shocks. Our re-
sults suggest that the implementation of such policies can signi¯cantly a®ect
the macroeconomic interdependence pattern that follows ¯scal expansions.
In welfare terms, public competition policies tend to widen the gap be-
tween country that expands and the other country. Another way of inter-
preting our results is that countries with a larger government sector should
have an incentive to promote the implementationof global structural reforms
of public spending management, such as the ones that we have represented
in the paper by an increase in the price elasticity of substitution of public
consumption.
18The same qualitative welfare results are also obtained in most of the case considered
for the sensitivity analysis, with the exception of the fact that, when the domestic country
is very big (n = :9), the overall e®ect on domestic welfare can actually be negative, while
an increase in ´ still has a positive e®ect on the utility response even in this case. See
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